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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of climate policy instruments for the decarbonisation of the global electricity sector
in a non-equilibrium economic and technology diffusion perspective. Energy markets are driven by innovation, path-
dependent technology choices and diffusion. However, conventional optimisation models lack detail on these aspects and
have limited ability to address the effectiveness of policy interventions because they do not represent decision-making.
As a result, known effects of technology lock-ins are liable to be underestimated. In contrast, our approach places
investor decision-making at the core of the analysis and investigates how it drives the diffusion of low-carbon technology
in a highly disaggregated, hybrid, global macroeconometric model, FTT:Power-E3MG. Ten scenarios to 2050 of the
electricity sector in 21 regions exploring combinations of electricity policy instruments are analysed, including their
climate impacts. We show that in a diffusion and path-dependent perspective, the impact of combinations of policies
does not correspond to the sum of impacts of individual instruments: synergies exist between policy tools. We argue
that the carbon price required to break the current fossil technology lock-in can be much lower when combined with
other policies, and that a 90% decarbonisation of the electricity sector by 2050 is affordable without early scrapping.
Keywords:
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1. Introduction
The electricity sector emits 38% of global energy-related
greenhouse gases (GHGs, IEA, 2012b). Investment plan-
ning in the electricity sector is therefore of critical impor-
tance to climate-change policy. Electricity production is
an energy sector with some of the longest time scales for
technological change, requiring particularly careful plan-
ning in order to avoid locking in, for many decades, to
heavily emitting systems that could commit society to
dangerous levels of global warming (Barker et al., 2007,
Edenhofer et al., 2014). Meeting emissions targets to
prevent warming beyond 2◦C significantly restricts the
number of possible pathways of energy sector develop-
ment (Rogelj et al., 2013). However warming beyond 2◦C
is likely to lead to catastrophic consequences for global
ecosystems and food chains, with important repercussions
for global human welfare (Field et al., 2014, Parry et al.,
2007). Large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in-
volve significant amounts of technology substitution, most
likely large scale socio-technical transitions (as defined by
Geels, 2002).
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Results of techno-economic studies of climate change
mitigation depend strongly on assumptions made concern-
ing technology dynamics (Lo¨schel, 2002). The majority of
studies of energy systems are made using either bottom-
up cost-optimisation, or top-down general equilibrium util-
ity optimisation (equilibrium) computational models, or a
combination of both. In these models however, dynam-
ics result mostly from the assumptions about optimisation
that underpin the modelling approaches.
In stark contrast with more traditional optimisation-
based approaches, this work proposes a new modelling
paradigm based exclusively on non-equilibrium dynam-
ics to simulate the impacts of specific policy frameworks,
through the economy, onto the environment. We present
an analysis of the global electricity sector with high res-
olution simulations of technology diffusion dynamics, us-
ing the ‘Future Technology Transformations’ framework
(FTT:Power),2 coupled with non-equilibrium macroeco-
nomics (E3MG),3 and environmental impacts derived by
2Future Technology Transformations in the Power sector
(Mercure, 2012), www.4cmr.group.cam.ac.uk/research/esm.
3The Energy-Economy-Environment Model at the Global level
(E3MG/E3ME Barker and Scrieciu, 2010), www.e3mgmodel.com,
www.e3me.com. E3MG and E3ME are variants of the same model
with different regional and sectoral classifications/resolution.
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combining emulators of the climate system (PLASIM-
ENTSem) and the carbon cycle (GENIEem).4
Uncoordinated technology dynamics are modelled at
the level of diverse profit-seeking investor decisions incen-
tivised by policy under bounded rationality, as opposed to
system level optimisation. This setup enables us to explore
the outcomes of particular energy policy tools for technol-
ogy diffusion, electricity generation, global emissions, cli-
mate change and macroeconomic change. The connection
of a diffusion framework to a non-equilibrium model of the
global economy opens a very rich world of macroeconomic
dynamics and technological change where the impacts of
energy policy reveal complex interactions between the en-
ergy sector and the economy.
Ten scenarios of the future global power sector up to
2050 are presented, creating a storyline to provide in-
sight for the construction of effective comprehensive en-
ergy policy portfolios in the context of non-equilibrium
dynamics. Going beyond carbon pricing only and consid-
ering other policies that could help trigger the diffusion
of new technologies, particular combinations are found to
feature mutual synergies that provide suitable environ-
ments for fast electricity sector decarbonisation: up to
90% by 2050. Macroeconomic dynamics in these scenar-
ios are summarised. High resolution scenario data are ac-
cessible on our website at www.4cmr.group.cam.ac.uk/
research/FTT/fttviewer, where costs, electricity gener-
ation and emissions can be explored in 21 world regions
and 24 technologies.
Decarbonisation involves the positive externality asso-
ciated to the global accumulation of knowledge and ex-
perience in scaling up, deploying and using new power
technologies. A classic collective action problem emerges:
learning cost reductions for new technologies may only be-
come significant and enable cost-effective diffusion when
most nations of the World demonstrate strong coordinated
dedication to their deployment. We show that carbon pric-
ing covering all world regions is a necessary but insufficient
component for the success of mitigation action in order to
break the current fossil fuel technology lock-in, unless the
price is very high.
As has been shown earlier (Barker and Scrieciu, 2010),
in the disequilibrium perspective, reductions in power
sector emissions may not necessarily imply significant
macroeconomic costs (direct and indirect) but instead,
could generate additional industrial activity and employ-
ment.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Review of the literature
The great majority of studies of energy systems at the
global scale are made using cost-optimisation computa-
4Planet Simulator - Efficient Numerical Terrestrial Scheme - Em-
ulator (PLASIM-ENTSem, Holden et al., 2014), Grid Enabled Inte-
grated Earth systems model - Emulator (GENIEem, Holden et al.,
2013).
tional models (a social planner approach).5 Meanwhile,
the economics of climate change are often represented us-
ing general equilibrium economic theory6 (fully rational
agent behaviour, perfect foresight and information, car-
ried out by a representative agent, and some variations
within these concepts, see Edenhofer et al., 2006, 2010,
Lo¨schel, 2002, for reviews of models), which tend to yield
negative macroeconomic impacts of climate change miti-
gation, one could argue, by construction.7 In both these
approaches, which together represent the current method-
ological standard, the assumptions about the nature of
agents make the optimisation problem involved tractable.
These assumptions about the nature of behaviour, how-
ever, may over-simplify aspects of an inherently complex
global energy-economic system that are crucial for climate
change mitigation, leaving open the question as to how
much results stem from these simplifications, and whether
relaxing these constraints changes perspectives.
Cost-optimisation technology models, in normative
mode, are still the most powerful tools for finding detailed,
lowest-cost future technology pathways that reach particu-
lar objectives. If used for descriptive purposes, they imply
a description of agents (investors, consumers) as identi-
cal, who possess a degree of information and technology
access as well as foresight sufficient to generate pathways
that are cost-optimal at the system level, which alterna-
tively corresponds to a controlled degree of coordination
between all actors involved in the evolution of the sys-
tem.8 As stated in the Global Energy Assessment (ch. 17,
Riahi et al., 2012), “A fundamental assumption underlying
the pathways is that the coordination required to reach the
multiple objectives simultaneously can be achieved”. While
this approach generates a significant simplification to a
highly complex system, it may be argued that such a spon-
taneous emergence of coordination is somewhat unlikely.
For instance liberalised energy markets involve actors free
to take their investment and consumption decisions based
on their particular circumstances, and are only incentivised
by policy. Thus while optimisation frameworks are valu-
able for identifying feasible and cost-effective pathways
that reach particular objectives at the system level, they
do not suggest how exactly to achieve them from a policy
standpoint, because they do not specifically model decision
making by diverse agents. Strong coordination is difficult
5For instance those based on the MARKAL/TIMES/TIAM fam-
ily of models (IEA/ETSAP, 2012, Seebregts et al., 2001), some vari-
ants of the MESSAGE model from IIASA (Messner and Strubegger,
1995), the AIM model from NIES in Japan (NIES, 2012),
REDGEM70 (Takeshita, 2011, 2012), DNE21+ (RITE, 2012) and
many more.
6Neoclassical, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE), Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) and other variations.
7For instance in the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2010), mitigation
costs are subtracted from GDP. In standard CGE models, due to
‘crowding out’, investments equal to those of mitigation are lost to
the economy, see section 3.5.
8Minimising total system cost as opposed to minimising individ-
ual project costs, the level where decisions take place.
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to generate from economic policy instruments, leading to
sub-optimal outcomes and technology lock-ins.
Meanwhile, equilibrium economic theory implies that
climate change mitigation costs are borne at the expense
of consumption or investment elsewhere,9 leading to detri-
mental economic impacts, which is not universally agreed
to occur (Barker and Scrieciu, 2010, Grubb et al., 2014).
In particular, equilibrium theory relies on decreasing or
constant returns to scale, becoming unstable in the pres-
ence of processes with increasing returns such as induced
technological change (Arthur, 1989). Increasing returns
also imply the property of path dependence and involve
complexity, where new ordering principles can emerge
from the interactions between system parts (Anderson,
1972, Arrow et al., 1995). Since path dependent systems
may not return to equilibrium after disturbances, scenar-
ios diverge from each other for small differences of starting
parameters, in a similar way to physical models of the cli-
mate.
Equilibrium economic analyses recommend carbon pric-
ing as the single most efficient policy tool to fix the climate
market failure, when equated to the social cost of emitting
carbon. However, it is recognised that some new technolo-
gies might not successfully bridge the technology innova-
tion ‘valley of death’ to the marketplace at politically prac-
ticable carbon prices without further government support
(Grubb et al., 2014, Murphy and Edwards, 2003). Deriv-
ing future scenarios using normative models and equilib-
rium economics is conceptually inconsistent with the sim-
ulation approach of climate science, and hence potentially
misleading for many important stakeholders.
A simulation approach without systems optimisation
is possible using known technology dynamics and a
model for decision-making at the firm level by diverse
agents (Mercure, 2012). Empirically repeatable dynam-
ics are known to exist in scaling up technology sys-
tems (e.g. S-shaped diffusion), and their costs (learn-
ing curves), which have been extensively studied for
decades (see the summary and analyses by Gru¨bler, 1998,
Gru¨bler et al., 1999, Wilson and Gru¨bler, 2011). Declin-
ing costs of technology with cumulative experience in scal-
ing them up can be modelled either at the bottom-up
scale (learning curves, e.g. McDonald and Schrattenholzer
2001, criticised by Nordhaus 2014), or at the aggre-
gate scale (induced technical change, Edenhofer et al.,
2006), aspects reviewed by Lo¨schel (2002). Mean-
while, mathematical generalisations of diffusion dynamics
have been suggested (e.g. Bhargava, 1989, Gru¨bler, 1990,
Karmeshu et al., 1985, Mercure, 2012, Metcalfe, 2004,
Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010, Saviotti and Mani,
1995) involving dynamic differential equations similar
to those in population growth mathematical ecology
(i.e. Lotka-Volterra systems, see Kot, 2001, Lotka, 1925,
9Since investment resources are assumed to be used optimally (full
employment), new investment in mitigation ‘crowds-out’ investment
elsewhere.
Volterra, 1939) and demography (e.g. Keyfitz, 1977, Lotka,
1925). In combination with evolutionary dynamics (e.g.
Nelson and Winter, 1982, Saviotti, 1991) and evolutionary
game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), this offers an
artillery of powerful concepts at the core of evolution-
ary economics (for a discussion, see Hodgson and Huang,
2012). This emphasises innovation, diffusion and specia-
tion10 as a source of economic development and growth
(Metcalfe, 1988, Nelson and Winter, 1982, Schumpeter,
1934, 1942), the clustering of which is possibly respon-
sible for ‘Kondratiev cycles’ (Freeman and Louc¸a˜, 2001).
These are broadly consistent with the ‘multi-level perspec-
tive’ on technology transitions described by Geels (2002,
2005). Furthermore, complexity and path dependence
emerge as key concepts to envisage technology dynamics
(Dosi and Metcalfe, 1991, Silverberg, 1988).
Intermediate scale models do exist that introduce in-
vestor/consumer diversity in technology choices driv-
ing changes in energy supply, end-use and emissions.
For example, agent-based models can be used to rep-
resent the multi-level perspective on technology tran-
sitions (Ko¨hler et al., 2009). Meanwhile models us-
ing multinomial logit structures parameterised by sur-
vey data provide a natural representation of diversity
(e.g. the CIMS model, Axsen et al., 2009, Mau et al.,
2008, Rivers and Jaccard, 2006) based on discrete choice
theory (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Both approaches
provide an appropriate replacement for the neoclassical
representative agent. However, even models with de-
tailed behavioural treatments do not currently have a
complete representation of empirically known technol-
ogy diffusion patterns as arise for instance in energy
systems (Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1978), which stem
from both the diversity of choice (e.g. early, middle
and late adopters, Rogers, 2010) and industrial dy-
namics (i.e. industrial capacity growth and decline, e.g.
Gru¨bler et al., 1999, Wilson, 2012). Conversely, evolu-
tionary models of technology innovation-diffusion (e.g.
Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2012) do not have de-
tailed representations of consumer choice and diversity.
But critically, both principles have not yet diffused
widely into mainstream global scale integrated climate-
energy systems modelling used for informing climate pol-
icy (where many models use exogenous diffusion rates,
as discussed by Wilson et al., 2013). Including these
would generate an improved methodological paradigm
(i.e. the paradigm suggested by Gru¨bler et al., 1999,
Wilson and Gru¨bler, 2011), which we propose here. In
such a framework, optimisation as a source of dynamic
force and representative agent behaviour is replaced by
empirically known innovation-selection-diffusion dynamics
with behaviour diversity, which are not characterised by
equilibria, but feature complex dynamics.
10Speciation in evolutionary theory means increasing diversity as
species increasingly subdivide into sub-species through mutation,
adapting to changing conditions.
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Figure 1: Top Flow of market shares from technology type j towards type i. Read from right to left: in a unit of time, out of all decommissions
of technology j, a proportion is chosen by investors to be replaced by technology i, of which only a fraction can be built given the share of
production capacity that exists for this technology, restricting the number of units of j that will successfully be replaced by units of i. Bottom
Schematic representation of eq. 1, where changes in market shares of technologies are equal to the sum of flows of shares between categories.
2.2. Technology diffusion in FTT:Power
Emissions reductions in the energy sector can occur
through technology substitution, between technologies
that produce the same substitutable service (e.g. elec-
tricity, heat, etc), through behaviour and practice changes
and through reductions in the consumption of that ser-
vice altogether. Technological change occurs primarily at
the average rate of replacement of existing technology as
it ages, which is inversely related to its life span. How-
ever, notwithstanding lifetime considerations, the number
of new units of technology of a particular type that can be
constructed at any one time can be larger if that industry
is in a well established position in the marketplace, with
a large production capacity, than if it is emerging. Even
when an emerging technology is (or is made) very afford-
able, it may not always be accessible to every investor
making a choice between available options. Thus in the
analysis of the diffusion capacity of technologies, not only
cost considerations as seen by diverse agents come into
play, but also a limited access to technology and infor-
mation, and these principles form the core of FTT:Power
(Fig. 1, see Mercure 2012 for a general model description,
and Mercure 2013 for a detailed mathematical derivation).
Appendix A provides a mathematical derivation of the
technology dynamics at the heart of the FTT model, given
here. Using the variable Si for the generation capacity
market share of a technology, the rate at which shares
of one technology type (j) can be replaced by shares of
another type (i) is proportional to:
1. The rate at which units of technology j come to the
end of their working life, with death rate τ−1j ,
2. How many old units of j require replacement, a frac-
tion Sj/τj of the total share of replacements.
3. The rate at which the construction capacity for tech-
nology i can be expanded, with growth rate t−1i ,
4. The market position of technology i, its share of the
market Si/ti.
This implies the following dynamical equation,
∆Si =
∑
j
SiSj (AijFijGij −AjiFjiGji)
1
τ
∆t, (1)
with matrix elements Aij expressing the rate of tech-
nology diffusion from industrial dynamics, Fij express-
ing the probability of investor preferences and Gij pro-
viding technical system constraints. τ−1 is the average
sectoral rate of technology turnover. This equation solves
to the classic logistic function of time in the special case
of two interacting technologies, with diffusion rate equal
to AijFijGij−AjiFjiGji. But generally, it is complex and
non-linear, and generates slow uptakes at small penetra-
tion, then fast diffusion at intermediate penetration, be-
fore a saturation near full penetration, the three matrices
together determining the pace of change. This complex
system cannot be solved analytically but is straightfor-
ward to evaluate numerically using time steps. It corre-
sponds to the replicator dynamics equation in evolution-
ary theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), equivalent to
a Lotka-Volterra set of equations of population dynamics
for competing species, also used in mathematical genetics
as well as in evolutionary economics (Saviotti and Mani,
1995): an ordering principle emerging from technology in-
teractions.
2.3. Learning-by-doing and path dependence
Profit-seeking investor choices Fij are driven by cost
differences, and these decrease over time as technolo-
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gies diffuse and follow learning curves (e.g. IEA, 2000,
McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001), generating increas-
ing returns to adoption. Learning-by-doing cost reductions
stem from the accumulation of technical knowledge on pro-
duction and economies of scale in expansion of produc-
tive capacity for specific technologies. Technology costs
are taken here to apply in globalised firms and markets.
Emerging technologies have fast cost reductions (e.g. so-
lar panels) while established systems see very little change
(e.g. coal plants). Cost reductions are decreasing functions
of cumulative investment, not time, and they do not oc-
cur if no investment is made. Learning thus interacts with
diffusion where it incentivises further uptake, which gener-
ates further learning and so on, a highly self-propagating
effect which can lead to sudden technology avalanches.
Such increasing returns to adoption give the crucial
property of path dependence to FTT:Power (Arthur, 1989).
As technologies diffuse following investor choices, the full
landscape of technology costs continuously changes, and
investor preferences thus change. These changes are per-
manent and determined by past investments, and there-
fore by the full history of the market, and different futures
emerge, depending on investment and policy choices along
the way. Technology costs and learning rates are given in
Mercure (2012), with more detail on the 4CMR website.
2.4. Natural resource use
The diffusion of power systems can only occur in areas
where energy resources are available, for instance windy ar-
eas for wind power, or natural water basins and rivers for
hydroelectric dams. Higher productivity sites offer lower
costs of electricity production, and tend to be chosen first
by developers. Assuming this, the progression of renewable
energy systems development follows increasing marginal
costs of production for potential new systems as only re-
sources of ever lower productivity are left to use (decreas-
ing returns to adoption). This is well described by cost-
supply curves (e.g. as in Hoogwijk et al., 2004, 2009). For
this purpose, a complete set of curves was previously esti-
mated from combined literature and data for 190 countries
and 9 types of renewable resources (Mercure and Salas,
2012). These were aggregated for the 21 regions of E3MG
(Appendix B). This produced 189 cost-supply curves that
are used to constrain the expansion of renewable systems
in FTT:Power. The consumption of non-renewable re-
sources is however better represented using a depletion
algorithm, described next.
2.5. Fossil fuel cost dynamics
Non-renewable energy resources lying in geological for-
mations have an arbitrary value that depends on their
cost of extraction, but also on the dynamics of the mar-
ket. To their cost of extraction is associated a minimum
value that the price of the commodity must take in or-
der for the extraction to be profitable. These costs are
however distributed over a wide range depending on the
nature of the geology (e.g. tar sands, ultra-deep offshore,
shale oil and gas, etc). Thus, given a certain demand for
the commodity, the price is a function of the extraction
cost of the most expensive resource extracted in order to
supply the demand, and it separates what is considered
reserves from resources. As reserves are gradually con-
sumed, the marginal cost increases generating a commod-
ity price increase that unlocks the exploitation of resources
situated in ever more difficult locations with higher ex-
traction costs. For example, tar sands became economical
and saw massive expansion above a threshold oil price of
around 85-95$/boe (NEB, 2011).11 Thus, to any commod-
ity demand path in time will correspond a path dependent
commodity price. The algorithm used here is described
with an analysis in Mercure and Salas (2013), relying on
data from Mercure and Salas (2012). In FTT:Power, this
model is used to determine fuel costs for fossil fuel and
nuclear based power technologies in global markets.
2.6. Modelling the global economy: E3MG
E3MG (and variant E3ME12) is an out-of-equilibrium
macroeconometric model of the global economy that has
been used widely for studies of climate change miti-
gation macroeconomics (e.g. Barker et al., 2012, 2006,
Barker and Scrieciu, 2010). It evaluates the parameters
of 28 econometric equations using data from 1971 to 2010,
and extrapolates these equations between 2010 and 2050.
The model features a high resolution: its equations are
evaluated for 21 regions of the world, 43 industrial sec-
tors, 28 sectors of consumption, 22 fuel users, and 12 fuel
types. Sectors are interrelated with dynamic input-output
tables. The model does not optimise economic resources
but incorporates endogenous growth and endogenous tech-
nical change. This is done following Kaldor’s theory of
cumulative causation (Kaldor 1957, Lee et al. 1990, see
also Lo¨schel 2002), where Technology Progress Indicators
(TPIs) are created by cumulating past investments I and
R&D spending using a relative time-weighting,13
TPI(t) ∝
∞∑
a=0
e−aτ1 ln (I(t− a) + τ2R&D(t− a)) . (2)
Such TPIs are used in the industrial prices, international
trade and employment regressions. Lower prices incen-
tivises higher consumption, and thus industrial investment
and R&D expenditures for production capacity expan-
sions, which lead to lower prices and so on, producing
a self-reinforcing cycle of cumulative causation of knowl-
edge accumulation. Including accumulated investment and
11Including upgrading costs. Extraction costs may have changed
since and significant uncertainties exist around these values, which
are allowed for in the model.
12For details of the econometric equations in both models, see the
E3ME website and manual at www.e3me.com.
13τ1 plays the role of knowledge depreciation while τ2 is a weighting
parameter for R&D.
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R&D makes E3MG non-linear, path-dependent and hys-
teretic, and thus far from equilibrium. E3MG region defi-
nitions are given in Appendix B.
2.7. Endogenous technical change and energy price-
demand interactions
The demand for electricity depends on its price, and it
is well known that in situations of high electricity prices,
people may strive to find more effective ways to use their
income, preferring to invest in more efficient technology,
perceived as a worthwhile tradeoff, or to simply reduce
their consumption. When the electricity supply technol-
ogy mix changes, the minimum price at which electricity
can be profitably sold also changes, and with such price
changes, the demand for electricity changes. For example,
when carbon pricing or feed-in tariffs are used to ensure
access of expensive renewables into the grid, the price of
electricity increases, affecting consumer demand and be-
haviour. Thus, reductions in emissions originate from both
a change in the carbon intensity of the power sector and
changes in the demand for electricity. These aspects of en-
ergy economics are prominent in this work, responsible for
a significant fraction of our calculated emissions reductions
in scenarios of climate policy.
Electricity demand is modelled in E3MG using an
econometric equation that incorporates a contribution
from spillovers from investment and R&D spending in
other sectors (Forssell 2000, see also the E3ME manual,
Cambridge Econometrics 2014). Since new investments
tend to involve technologies with higher energy efficiencies
and because the turnover of capital does not allow return
to old technology, here the TPI is formed by cumulat-
ing positive increases in investment and R&D, which thus
cannot decrease.14 The energy demand equation takes the
form
Xik = β
0
ik + β
1
ikYik + β
2
ikPik + β
3
ikTPIik + ǫik, (3)
where for fuel i and region k, Xik is (in log space) the fuel
demand, Yik represents sectoral output, Pik relative prices.
Economic feedbacks between FTT:Power and E3MG oc-
cur with four quantities: electricity prices, fuel use, power
technology investments and tax revenue recycling.
2.8. Emulating large models of the natural world
Detailed models of the Earth system are highly dynami-
cal, complex and computationally demanding. An efficient
way to integrate dynamic responses to inputs from other
models is to create reduced-order statistical representa-
tions of model outputs (‘emulators’) which can be used
as surrogate models for coupling applications. Emulators
provide a method of analysing the otherwise intractable
cascade of uncertainty across multiple complex systems.
14According to the study performed by Forssell (2000), this de-
scribes historical data better than the TPI given in eq. 2.
This approach was used here in order to obtain represen-
tations of the planet’s carbon cycle and its climate system,
by emulating data produced by the large models PLASIM-
ENTS and GENIE-1 (Foley et al., 2014). Appendix C
provides a detailed account of the procedure.
E3MG-FTT emissions in each scenario were fed to the
carbon cycle emulator, in order to obtain a trace of CO2
concentrations within an uncertainty range. This trace
with uncertainty was fed to the emulator of the climate
system in order to obtain a trace of future global warming
and climate change within an uncertainty range, which
thus cascades the uncertainty of both models.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Scenario creation and policy instruments
Ten scenarios of electricity policy assumptions of differ-
ent types and resulting technology mix and emissions up to
year 2050 were created with FTT:Power-E3MG, lettered
a to j (Fig. 2). These all lead to different futures for the
global power sector and different CO2 emission profiles.
It is impractical to reproduce all the information of these
simulations in this paper, and therefore a summary of the
results is given here, the details having been made avail-
able on the 4CMR website,15 where they can be displayed
in terms of the full resolution of 21 world regions and 24
power technologies, for policy assumptions, electricity gen-
eration, emissions and levelised costs. Four energy policy
tools were explored: carbon pricing/taxing,16 technology
subsidies, feed-in tariffs (FiTs) and direct regulations. In-
dividual tools and various combinations were explored, a
summary given in figure 2. By gradually elaborating vari-
ous policy frameworks, a scenario was found where power
sector emissions are reduced by 90% below the 1990 level,
involving all four policy instruments used simultaneously.
Emissions are fed to the carbon cycle and climate model
emulators GENIEem and PLASIM-ENTSem in order to
determine the resulting atmospheric CO2 concentration
and average global warming, for these scenarios where
other sectors are not targeted by climate policy.
The nature of FiTs here is that access to the grid at
a competitive price is ensured (a price higher than the
consumer price), the difference being paid by the grid
and passed on to consumers through the price of elec-
tricity.17 The consumer price of electricity is raised by
just the amount that makes this economically viable. The
consumer price in the model is derived from an averaged
15http://www.4cmr.group.cam.ac.uk/research/FTT/fttviewer
16Carbon pricing or taxing is not conceptually different in FTT,
since the price/rate is determined outside of the model. E3MG does
not currently solve an endogenous carbon price; it is fully exogenous.
17FiT prices, although they could be made so, do not depend on
capacity here by design.
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Figure 2: Electricity generation and emissions in ten scenarios of policy. The dashed vertical lines delimitate historical IEA data from
FTT:Power-E3MG scenarios, while the horizontal dashed lines indicate the 1990 electricity generation and emissions levels. Percent values
indicate emissions reductions with respect to the 1990 level. The left panels show electricity generation by technology, while the right panels
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Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE),18
P ∝
∑
GiLCOEi/
∑
Gi, (4)
with Gi the electricity generation. The LCOE as perceived
by investors when a FiT exists includes an ‘effective sub-
sidy’ given by the grid that covers the difference between
the levelised cost of a technology and the consumer price
of electricity plus a margin (investors here may be corpo-
rate or homeowners). In the case of carbon pricing, the
LCOE calculation that investors are assumed to perform
includes a carbon cost component, and the price of carbon
is passed on to consumers through the price of electricity.
Thus the price of electricity also increases with the carbon
price unless emitting technologies are phased out.
Technology subsidies are fractions of the capital costs
of low carbon technologies that are paid by the govern-
ment, reducing the LCOE that investors face. These are
defined exogenously for every year up to 2050 and are
phased out before then, after which it is hoped that the
technology cost landscape becomes permanently altered
such that technologies do not need to be indefinitely sub-
sidised. Regulations refer to controlling the construction
of new units of particular technologies, and can be used to
phase out particular types of systems. When a regulation
is applied to a technology category, no new units are built
but existing ones are left to operate until the end of their
lifetime.
Fig. 2 summarises the result of the policy tools explo-
ration. Electricity generation by technology type is given
in the series of panels to the left of each pair, while emis-
sions are given on the right. The vertical dashed lines
indicate the start of the simulations in 2008, and trends
to the left of this line are historical data from the IEA
(2012a,b). The horizontal dashed lines indicate the 1990
levels of electricity demand and emissions. Dashed curves
correspond to the baseline values for comparison. In all
scenarios excluding the baseline, policy schemes generate
both a reduction of electricity consumption and emissions.
Consumption reduces due to increases in the price of elec-
tricity, through the energy demand econometric equation
of E3MG, which contributes significantly to emissions re-
ductions. All additional emissions reductions are due to
changes in fuels used associated to changes of technologies.
CO2 emission levels in 2050 with respect to the 1990 level
are given in percent values.
3.2. Climate policy for achieving 90% reductions in power
sector emissions
The baseline scenario (Fig. 2 panel a), which involves
maintaining current policies until 2050,19 leads to global
18Using historical data, in order to preserve local taxation schemes,
scaled to change according to the rate of change of this technology
average. For an exact definition of our use of the LCOE, see Mercure
(2012) or IEA (2010).
19Carbon pricing for the EU-ETS only, reaching 80 2008$/tCO2
in 2050.
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Figure 3: (Main Graph) Two sets of exogenous carbon prices for
all regions of the world, where the set carbon price 1 was used in
scenarios c,e,f of figure 2 while the set carbon price 2 was used
in scenarios c,g,h,i. (Inset) World average of all sets of technology
subsidies used in scenarios e,g,h,j.
power sector emissions in 2050 of 30 GtCO2/y, 318% above
the 1990 level, and total emissions of 65 GtCO2/y. Cu-
mulative emissions for the time span 2000-2050 amount
to 2321 GtCO2. According to the model, this pathway
is likely to commit the planet to a warming that exceeds
4◦C above pre-industrial levels in around 2100 (Fig. 4 and
section 3.3 below, with high probability), consistent with
Zickfeld et al. (2009) and Meinshausen et al. (2009).20 In
view of finding ways to reduce the power sector’s share of
these emissions and to limit global warming, we searched
areas of policy space for effective abatement in the short
time span.
The first option explored (panel b) was to use reg-
ulations to prevent the construction of new coal power
plants worldwide, the systems with highest emissions
(≃1 ktCO2/GWh), unless they are equipped with carbon
capture and storage (CCS). This results mostly in a trans-
fer from a coal lock-in to a gas lock-in, reducing global
emissions approximately to the 1990 level, largely insuffi-
cient for meeting the 2◦C target.
The second option was to use carbon pricing as a unique
tool, with different price values for different regions cov-
ering all world regions shown in Fig. 3, between 100 and
200 2008$/tCO2 in 2050 (panel c) and between 200 and
400 2008$/tCO2 (panel d). This measure, mostly gener-
ating reductions in electricity consumption due to higher
electricity prices, yields emissions of around 65% above the
20Extrapolating this emissions trend linearly to 2100, where cumu-
lative emissions in 2100 could be > 9000 GtCO2, or 2500 PgC, leads
to at least a 75% probability of exceeding 4◦C, especially if emissions
do not stabilise by then, according to Zickfeld et al. (2009). We find
a 5% probability of warming of less than 3.6◦C, see below.
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1990 level and to 9% below the 1990 level, respectively.
This modest impact suggests that carbon pricing on its
own requires very high carbon prices in order to generate
significant reductions, or that it is simply insufficient.21
However as we show now, combinations of policies achieve
this much more effectively.
As a first combination of policies, FiTs (wind and solar)
and technology subsidies (all other low carbon technologies
except wind and solar) were introduced without carbon
pricing (panel e), of order 30-50% of capital costs for tech-
nology subsidies and feed-in prices 5-15% above the elec-
tricity price for FiTs. The fine details depend on regions
and technologies, see the inset of Fig. 3 for a world average
or the data on our website for details. This generates very
modest uptakes of low carbon technologies and thus small
changes in emissions compared to the baseline, 276% above
1990. This is due to the low cost of producing electricity
using fossil fuels in comparison to all other technologies,
in particular coal, and therefore without very high sub-
sidies, carbon pricing is necessary in order to bridge this
cost difference.
Scenario f shows the use of carbon pricing up to
200$/tCO2 with FiTs, the latter generating very little
change over scenario c. Using carbon pricings of up to
200$/tCO2 in combination with technology subsidies and
FiTs in all world regions (panel g) yields emissions of 32%
above the 1990 level, still insufficient. With carbon pric-
ing of up to 400$/tCO2 in combination with the same set
of technology subsidies and FiTs (panel h), reductions are
much larger, 46% below the 1990 level. This indicates how
the impact of policy combinations may be larger than the
sum of the impacts of its components taken separately,
offering significant potential synergies.
A scenario was explored where only the developed
world applies the stringent climate policies of scenario h
(panel i), in which it is hoped that this generates enough
investment to bring the costs of low carbon technologies
down into the mainstream, thus becoming accessible to
developing or under-developed countries. We see no no-
ticeable uptake of new technology in these countries, costs
remaining unaccessible especially in comparison with coal
based technologies, and as a consequence global emissions
remain at 204% above the 1990 level.
A significant amount of the remaining power sector
emissions in scenario h reside in China (79%), where the
lock-in of coal technology is very difficult to break given
the near absence of alternatives with the exception of hy-
droelectricity, which is driven to its natural resource limits.
The choice of investors thus needs to be constrained at the
expense of having to sell electricity at higher prices. There-
fore regulations were introduced in scenario j in China that
prevent the construction of new coal power stations unless
they are equipped with CCS. This additional policy forces
21Standard analyses using marginal abatement cost curves assume
an instantaneous implementation of mitigation measures, and thus
are able to have carbon prices equal to their cost.
additional diversity in the Chinese technology mix, bring-
ing down global emissions to 90% below the 1990 level
without early scrapping. Note that it is possible that un-
der different scenarios of technology subsidies, FiTs and
regulations, the carbon price necessary for these emissions
reductions could be lower, requiring further investigations
in this complex parameter space. Total cumulative emis-
sions for the time period 2000-2050 in scenario j (in the
baseline) are of 1603 Gt (2321 Gt), given that other sec-
tors do not change their technologies significantly, of which
350 Gt (893 Gt) originate from the electricity sector alone.
3.3. Climate change projections
Global emissions from all sectors in scenarios a to j were
fed into the carbon cycle emulator (GENIEem) in order
to calculate the resulting CO2 concentrations with their
uncertainty range, which themselves were supplied to the
climate system emulator (PLASIM-ENTSem) in order to
find out their climate change impacts with climate uncer-
tainty, cascading the uncertainty of the carbon cycle into
that of the climate system. Figure 4, top panel, displays
global CO2 emissions for all scenarios of Fig. 2, including
however all fuel combustion emissions from endogenous
sources in the model as well as exogenous trends of emis-
sions for non-fuel-related sectors (e.g. land use), obtained
from the EDGAR database. While the changes modelled
include those in power sector emissions of Fig. 2, they also
include modest changes in other sectors (e.g. industry)
occurring due to carbon pricing for all fuel users subject
to the emissions trading scheme and due to changes in
economic activity.
In order to run the climate model emulator, emissions
were required up to 2100. In complex models such as
E3MG or climate models, uncertainty increases with time
span from the present. This currently makes convergence
more difficult in E3MG beyond 2050, especially in scenar-
ios of stringent climate policy which may lead the model
to venture near the boundary of the behavioural space de-
fined by its econometric relationships prescribed by data
prior to 2010. However the primary interest in this work
resides in assessing the impacts of near term policy action
on the future state of the world. Since the baseline scenario
emissions trend is very nearly linear, it was extrapolated
with a polynomial to 2100, as well as those of scenarios e
and i. All other scenarios feature stabilised emissions in
2050 (b, c, d, f , g, h and i), and thus their 2050 emis-
sions values were assumed to be maintained constant up
to 2100.
The middle panel of Fig. 4 shows the resulting atmo-
spheric CO2 concentrations, with uncertainty given as a
blue area. It was observed that scenario a already reaches
a median value of 533 ± 30 ppm in 2050 while scenario j
reaches 485± 20 ppm. This is above the generally agreed
threshold of 450 ppm for maintaining warming below 2◦C.
These concentrations with uncertainty were fed to the cli-
mate model emulator (Fig. 4, bottom). For the baseline
scenario, this yielded global warming median temperature
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Figure 4: (Top) Total global anthropogenic emissions in all ten sce-
narios of Fig. 2. (Middle) CO2 concentrations, the blue area repre-
senting the 95% confidence range. (Bottom) Global warming with
respect to the pre-industrial level, the inner blue area delimitating
the 95% confidence range of the climate model, and the outer blue
area showing the combined carbon cycle and climate model uncer-
tainties. The top of the blue areas indicate the uncertainty boundary
for the highest concentration and warming scenario, while the bot-
tom of the blue area refers to the uncertainty boundary of the lowest
concentration and warming scenario.
changes of between 3.9◦C and 6.7◦C over pre-industrial
levels with a median value of 5.0◦C22 when using the
median concentration and only the climate model uncer-
tainty, and between 3.6◦C and 7.2◦C with the same median
when cascading the carbon cycle uncertainty into that of
the climate model. This therefore could in principle exceed
as high as 7.2◦C of warming with a low probability.
Meanwhile, the electricity decarbonisation scenario j
yields warming values of between 2.9◦C and 4.8◦C, median
of 3.6◦C, with carbon cycle uncertainty only and between
2.6◦C and 5.2◦C, same median, with both carbon cycle
and climate model uncertainties. The electricity sector
decarbonisation scenario thus has a negligible probability
of not exceeding 2◦C of warming. This indicates that the
decarbonisation of the power sector by as much as 90% is
insufficient if other sectors such as transport and industry
are not specifically targeted by climate policy, in order to
avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change.
3.4. Learning cost reductions and energy price dynamics
The uptake of low carbon technologies generate learn-
ing cost reductions that alter permanently the technology
cost landscape. Figure 5 shows world averages of bare
technology costs (upper panels) for the baseline and mit-
igation scenario j, regionally weighted by electricity gen-
eration, excluding technology subsidies, the carbon price
and FiTs. These values, when including policy, drive in-
vestor choices in both the baseline (left) and the mitigation
(right) scenarios. Roughly speaking, decreases stem from
learning-by-doing cost reductions while increases originate
from increasing natural resource scarcity with develop-
ment. While the cost of PV panels decreases in the base-
line scenario mainly due to deployment in Europe, it de-
creases by more than half its 2008 value in the mitiga-
tion scenario where they benefit from FiTs everywhere.
Meanwhile, onshore wind power does come into the main-
stream in many regions of the world in the mitigation
scenario and does not necessitate support all the way to
2050, where the value of the wind FiTs become near zero
or even negative, in which case the policy is dropped alto-
gether. In other regions, wind power is limited by resource
constrained decreasing capacity factors and corresponding
increasing costs. Other technologies, such as geothermal
or wave power (not shown), see very little uptake in this
particular mitigation scenario and therefore little cost re-
ductions.
The costs of producing electricity, defined as share-
weighted average LCOEs, are given for 6 aggregate regions
in the lower panels of Fig. 5. Such a marginal cost is used
in E3MG to construct electricity prices in 21 regions, of
which the changes alter electricity consumption. These are
22A temperature change of 0.6◦C between pre-industrial levels
and 2000 was assumed, see Meinshausen et al. (2009) and NASA
data at http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/tabledata_v3/GLB.
Ts+dSST.txt.
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Figure 5: (Top panels) LCOE per technology excluding carbon pricing, technology subsidies and FiTs, for the baseline (a) and the mitigation
scenarios (b). Bottom Panels Marginal cost of electricity production for 6 world regions, for the baseline (c) and the mitigation scenarios (d).
different between regions, stemming from different technol-
ogy and resource landscapes, where lower marginal costs
correspond to higher shares of coal based electricity. Sig-
nificant increases are observed in the 90% decarbonisation
scenario in all regions, reflecting the cost of the energy
transition passed-on to consumers.
The marginal costs of fossil fuels are calculated using es-
timates of reserves and resources, described in section 2.5,
and are not highly affected by changes in policy in these
scenarios. In both scenarios oil and gas costs increase sig-
nificantly up to 2050 in a similar way, but these increases
are dampened by the massive accession to unconventional
fossil fuel resources (oil sands, heavy oil and shale gas).
This analysis will be expanded elsewhere. Coal costs are
only moderately affected by changes in demand due to
large coal resources. The cost of natural uranium ore is
stable until 2035 where an increase is observed, generated
by increasing scarcity, and at this level of consumption, U
resources are projected to run out before 2100 unless tech-
nology changes (e.g. thorium reactors, see IAEA, 2009,
Mercure and Salas, 2012, 2013).
3.5. Global economic impacts of a 90% reduction scenario
The macroeconomic impacts of scenarios a and j in
E3MG is a vast subject beyond the scope of the present
paper, and will only be summarised here. We find that
decarbonising the electricity sector by 90% has mod-
erate economic benefits, generating additional employ-
ment, real household income and increases in GDP of be-
tween 1 and 3% (depending on the region) in compari-
son to scenario a, broadly consistent with previous similar
analyses performed with the model (Barker et al., 2006,
Barker and Scrieciu, 2010). This is due to two oppos-
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ing forces acting against one another: the introduction of
low carbon technologies force increases in electricity prices
(as seen in Fig. 5), lowering real household disposable in-
come, while low carbon technology production generates
further employment in various industrial sectors, increas-
ing household income. These were observed to roughly
cancel each other out, which is possible as long as labour
and capital (investment) resources can be made available
(Barker and Scrieciu, 2010).
In our scenarios, carbon pricing generates government
income larger than government spending on technology
subsidies, the rest being redistributed to households in the
form of income tax reductions, increasing further their dis-
posable income. The resulting impacts are therefore of in-
creased household income and consumption in comparison
to the baseline and thus higher GDP. It is to be noted
however that there are winners and losers in this picture
both in terms of sectors and world regions, depending how
much they depend on activities of the oil, gas and coal
sectors.
In this disequilibrium demand-led perspective, our as-
sumptions about capital and labour markets are consistent
with our assumptions of energy markets, in that these re-
sources are not assumed currently used optimally and their
markets do not automatically produce optimal outcomes.
This means that excess finance as well as unemployment
exist in the model. This contrasts with the results of many
other economic models used to assess the economic im-
pacts of climate change mitigation (e.g. see the model
comparison in Edenhofer et al., 2010), which tend to give
moderate negative impacts. The main difference stems
precisely from assumptions over economic resources: in
general equilibrium theory, displacing economic resources
that are optimally used can only lead to effects detrimental
to the economy (crowding out effects). However unemploy-
ment does exist in the world economy, and it is not gen-
erally agreed that investment resources are currently used
to their utmost potential (Grubb et al., 2014). Further re-
search into this issue is crucial and requires modelling the
global financial sector, absent in equilibrium theory,23 but
also not specifically treated in our model.
3.6. Local scenarios of power generation and emissions
It proves instructive to analyse electricity technol-
ogy landscapes in individual regions of the world in
FTT:Power-E3MG, for policy analysis and for better un-
derstanding the nature of technology lock-ins and the re-
stricted local ability to change in a diffusion perspective.
This is presented in Fig. 6 for six key regions or countries:
North America, Europe, China, India, Brazil and the Rest
of the World, which have different electricity landscapes
stemming from differing energy policy strategies and engi-
neering traditions historically, as well as natural resource
23Rational expectations in equilibrium theory mean that agents
with perfect foresight never default on their debts, which implies a
non-existence of risk in finance.
endowments. National strategies, reflecting local engineer-
ing specialisation related to technology lock-ins, is a natu-
ral outcome of this model’s structure (eq. 1), which repro-
duces the better ability of dominating industries to capture
the market despite costs.
Renewable energy systems are more exploited in Europe
than anywhere else in the world, except in Brazil, where
hydroelectricity dominates. Europe also sees the most di-
verse electricity sector, with large amounts of wind power
already in the baseline scenario, predominantly in north-
ern Europe and the British Isles, large amounts of nuclear
power in France, and some solar power in Germany. Coal
fired electricity is mostly phased out before 2050 in the
90% scenario, resulting in significant emissions reductions.
North America features higher use of fossil fuels for
power production than Europe. However, while E3MG
projects a larger potential for consumption reductions,
large opportunities for diversification also emerge with sig-
nificant potentials of renewable energy. Bioenergy with
CCS generates a large contribution to American emissions
reductions.24
China and India have very low technology diversity and
important fossil fuel lock-ins. The amount of coal used in
China in the baseline is responsible for 10 out of 30 Gt
of global emissions in 2050. Diversification proves diffi-
cult given the scale of the rate of increase in consumption;
breaking the coal lock-in requires regulations in China to
phase out building new coal generators. Large scale dif-
fusion of renewables is slow and retrofitting CCS to coal
generators offers a useful alternative. Electricity demand
reductions are very large, which requires further investiga-
tions for fuel poverty and other social implications.
In Brazil, even though hydroelectricity is not the least
expensive resource, it nevertheless dominates, another
form of technology lock-in. This is typical of a na-
tional engineering tradition dominated by a technology for
decades.25 Brazil is projected to persist in developing its
hydropower capacity despite higher costs and a decreasing
potential, until the cost becomes prohibitively high and
only less productive hydro resources remain.
The rest of the world includes predominantly countries
where the diversity of existing technologies is low, and
persists in this direction. It features large amounts of
oil use for electricity despite high oil prices, due to re-
stricted access to technology or fossil fuel subsidies, which
are not successfully phased out despite being the least cost-
effective way of producing electricity. Coal based electric-
ity makes the dominant contribution to emissions in the
24Note that negative emissions from biomass combustion and se-
questration could involve a transfer of emissions from the power to
the land use sectors, if important land use changes take place, or if
fossil fuels are used in the production of biomass. This should be
investigated using consistent land-use modelling.
25A similar situation exists in France with nuclear power, in
Canada with hydroelectricity, in China with coal-fired power sta-
tions, and originates from either or both an abundance of resources
and historical energy policy strategies that have shaped the local
expertise, becoming a ‘tradition’ despite cost considerations.
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Figure 6: Electricity production and CO2 emissions for six regions covering the world, with associated emissions in two scenarios. In all plots,
the vertical dashed lines separates historical IEA data from FTT:Power-E3MG scenarios, while horizontal dashed lines indicate the 1990 level
of CO2 emissions. Figures on the left are for the baseline scenario while those on the right are for the 90% mitigation scenario, the sum of
the data for all regions being equal to the data of figure 2. Note that red patches in emissions data, for biomass with CCS, indicate negative
contributions.
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baseline, the rest divided between oil and gas fired power
stations, for a total of 12 out of 30 Gt of global emissions
in 2050 in the baseline. In the mitigation scenario, a sig-
nificant additional hydroelectricity potential is developed,
and coal is replaced by gas turbines, which are eventually
retrofitted with CCS.
4. Conclusions and policy implications
4.1. Synergy between policy instruments
This paper shows that in a coupled energy-economy-
environment model that does not assume economic equi-
librium or use technology cost-optimisation, the impact of
policy instruments can be different if used individually or
in combinations: the impact of combined policy packages
does not correspond to the sum of the impacts of individual
instruments. Thus significant synergies exist between pol-
icy instruments. In this regard we showed that in a tech-
nology diffusion perspective, carbon pricing alone is not
likely capable of delivering sufficient emissions reductions
unless it is unrealistically high; it requires to be combined
with technology subsidies, FiTs and regulations. This can
be ascribed largely to the inertia of diffusion, and contrasts
with the neoclassical environmental economics view that
pricing the externality generates the desired outcome most
efficiently (e.g. Anthoff and Tol, 2013, Nordhaus, 2010)26.
Our model results indicate that relying on carbon pric-
ing alone even up to 400 2008$/tCO2 is likely to lead to
a status quo in the technology mix while delivering very
expensive electricity to consumers. Similarly, technology
subsidies and FiTs on their own have little impact unless
they are combined with sufficiently high carbon pricing.
We furthermore suggested that particular combinations
of policy instruments can produce such strong synergy that
reductions of electricity sector emissions of 90% by 2050
(61% of 2000-2050 cumulative baseline power sector emis-
sions) become possible without early scrapping of electric-
ity generation capital. Such strong reductions could be
complemented by additional reductions in other emissions
intensive sectors with additional cross-sectoral synergies:
transport, industry and buildings, warranting further work
in this area. If early scrapping is allowed, these reductions
could be achieved even faster, but would most likely in-
volve higher costs. Finally, different combinations of the
policies analysed here could also lead to 90% emissions re-
ductions, for example with lower carbon prices and higher
technology subsidies, FiTs and/or more regulations.
4.2. The effect of global knowledge spillovers on technology
costs: individual vs global coordinated action
Technology systems typically face a vicious cycle: estab-
lished technologies thrive because they are established, and
26Note that the concept of equating a marginal abatement cost to
a social cost of carbon in a path-dependent perspective is ambiguous:
several prices can be assigned to both quantities depending on the
context and history.
emerging technologies see barriers to their diffusion due to
the lock-in of established technologies. This is the case un-
less an emerging technology is a radical improvement over
the incumbent, or it benefits from sufficient external sup-
port. Emerging technologies require investment and sales
in order to benefit from improvements and economies of
scale: repetition, trial and error enables entrepreneurs to
improve their products. They thus require a continuous
flow of funds from sales or external investment in order
to survive until their products take off on their own in
the market. In the long run, these investments may or
may not generate a return, and are thus risky. Without
any investment to bridge the ‘technology valley of death’,
however, they may become failed innovations.
Given estimated learning curves of power systems, a cer-
tain additional capacity of emerging technologies such as
wind turbines and solar PV panels must be deployed in or-
der to bring down their costs to a competitive level set by
incumbent technologies. As we find here, this additional
capacity is very large, and cannot be deployed by a sin-
gle nation such as Germany or even the whole of Europe,
for the rest of the world to benefit. In contrast, we find
that only a concerted global climate policy effort can bring
down costs to manageable levels and bring new power tech-
nologies into the mainstream, opening very large renew-
able energy potentials such as that of solar energy. Such
a concerted effort can significantly and permanently alter
the global landscape of power technology costs and avail-
ability. We stress that all countries of the world can benefit
from learning cost reductions that originate from invest-
ments and sales occurring in various locations. This prob-
lem therefore possesses the features of a classic free-rider
and collective action problem, where international coordi-
nation is the only way by which these cost reductions can
take place. Emerging or developed nations cannot sim-
ply ‘wait’ for climate policy in other nations to generate
diffusion and enough learning cost reductions for new tech-
nologies to become competitive: without their involvement
they might potentially never become competitive. If the
power sector is to decarbonise by 2050, all countries are
most likely required to make a contribution to the devel-
opment of the renewables industry.
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Appendix A. Substitution dynamics
The decision-making process by diverse agents can be
expressed with probabilistic pairwise comparisons of op-
tions. Investors do not all face similar situations and do
not weigh different aspects in the same way, which cannot
possibly be enumerated specifically in a model. However,
when dealing with large numbers of instances of decision
making, there will be majority trends in investor choices,
who may be assumed, if all relevant considerations are
quantified into costs, to be seeking cost minimisation with
the goal of profit maximisation for their own respective
firms.27 Data derived probability distributions may thus
be used in order to avoid enumerating the details of all sit-
uations faced by investors, and where a particular technol-
ogy is on average more profitable to use than a second one,
there usually exist specific situations where the reverse
turns out to be true. This provides a crucial simple rep-
resentation of diversity in decision-making. In this form,
this is a binary logit model (see Ben-Akiva and Lerman,
1985).
The statistical trend of investor preferences may be ex-
pressed as a matrix Fij expressing the relative fractions of
investor choices between two technologies i and j out of
a set. For example, if Fij = 70% and Fji = 30%, then
investors faced with these two options would choose 70%
of the time technology i and 30% of the time technology
j. This can be derived using probability distributions for
technology costs (derived from recent investment data, a
form of revealed preferences),28 calculating the number of
instances where technology type i is seen as less expensive
than j. In the spirit of discrete choice theory, the prob-
ability that technology j is perceived less expensive than
technology i, and the converse, are
Fij(∆C) =
∫
∞
−∞
Fj(C −∆C)fi(C)dC, (A.1)
Fji(∆C) =
∫
∞
−∞
Fi(C +∆C)fj(C)dC, (A.2)
where F (C) is a cumulative cost distribution function
while f(C) is a cost distribution density, while ∆C is an
average cost difference.
27Profit maximisation at the firm level, rather than cost minimi-
sation at the whole system level, is the crucial difference between
this bottom-up investor behaviour approach the common top-down
cost-optimisation. See for instance Nelson and Winter 1982.
28Here, we have used a published survey, IEA 2010. More details
are given in Mercure 2012.
Innovation generates new technologies that live in niches
that protect them from the wider market. From those
niches, in appropriate changes of market conditions, can
emerge and diffuse new socio-technical regimes (Geels,
2002, 2005). After the innovation phase, at the level of
diffusion, technologies enter what we termed the ‘demo-
graphic phase’ (Mercure, 2013), because the derivation fol-
lows standard population dynamics for competing species,
as in Kot (2001). The four building block arguments enu-
merated in section 2.2 are summarised as follows.
(1-2) The rate at which units of technology come to the
end of their lifetime stems from survival analysis, where a
cumulative probability of failure yields a survival function
ℓj(a) of age a. The number of units retired from operation
δj , and the number remainingNj, relate to how many were
built a years in the past ξj(t− a), with life expectancy τj :
Nj(t) =
∫
∞
0
ξj(t− a)ℓj(a)da, (A.3)
δj(t) =
∫
∞
0
ξj(t− a)
dℓj(a)
da
da ≃
Nj
τj
, τj =
∫
∞
0
ℓj(a)da.
(A.4)
(3-4) The rate at which units of technology get pro-
duced depends on available production capacity, and pro-
duction capacity is built out of profits on sales, leading to a
virtuous cycle that gradually builds up. A ‘birth’ function
mi(a) can be defined that enables to determine the growth
of production capacity δNi from historical sales ξi(t − a)
with re-investment rate Ri:
δNi(t) = Ri
∫
∞
0
ξi(t− a)mi(a)da ≃
Nj
ti
, (A.5)
with a growth rate determined by
ti =
τi
RiΦi
, Φi =
∫
∞
0
mi(a)da, (A.6)
a growth time constant much shorter than the life ex-
pectancy (ti ≪ τi, births occur RiΦi faster than deaths).
Finally, constraints of the power system prevent some
types of technology from dominating.29 These can be ex-
pressed with a second matrix Gij , stopping investments
that lead to stranded or unused assets due to technical
problems (grid stability).
Using the equation in Fig. 1, and normalising unit num-
bers into market shares, we calculate the flow of market
shares from technology of type j towards category i:
∆Sj→i ∝
(
Si
τi
)
(FijGij)
(
Sj
tj
)
∆t ∝ SiSjAijFijGij∆t.
Since, according to the binary logit, the reverse choice is
allowed, there is a simultaneous reverse flow of substitu-
tions,
∆Si→j ∝
(
Sj
τj
)
(FjiGji)
(
Si
ti
)
∆t ∝ SjSiAjiFjiGji∆t,
29For instance related to their supply properties or variability (e.g.
as with wind power).
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the net exchange between categories i and j is
∆Sij = SiSj (AijFijGij −AjiFjiGji)
∆t
τ
. (A.7)
Adding up flows between all possible technologies j and
category i yields the main equation 1.
Appendix B. Model regions
E3MG-FTT Region Member countries
1- USA USA
2- Japan Japan
3- Germany Germany
4- UK UK
5- France France
6- Italy Italy
7- Rest of EU-15 Austria, Belgium, Danemark, Finland,
Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden
8- EU-12 Czech, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Romania
9- Canada Canada
10- Australia Australia
11- OECD NES Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland,
Turkey
12- Russia Russia
13- Rest of Annex I Belarus, Croatia, Ukraine
14- China China
15- India India
16- Mexico Mexico
17- Brazil Brazil
18- NICs South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Taiwan, Thailand
19- OPEC Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Venezuela
20- Rest of the World All other countries not specified elsewhere
21- Indonesia Indonesia
Table B.1: World regions in E3MG-FTT.
Appendix C. Climate system emulation
To assess climate impacts requires models of both the
carbon cycle and the climate. Here we use simplified,
statistically derived representations (emulators) of these
two systems as described in more detail by Foley et al.
(2014). No direct feedback from climate to economy is im-
plemented, but our approach does allow for spatially and
temporally resolved analysis of climate impacts, including
the effects of uncertainty in the climate system.
The carbon cycle is represented by GENIEem, an emu-
lator of the Grid Enabled Integrated Earth system model
(GENIE-1 Holden et al., 2013). It takes as inputs a
time series of anthropogenic CO2 emissions produced by
FTT:Power-E3MG and a scenario of non-CO2 radiative
forcing (including the effects of CH4, N2O, halocarbons,
aerosols and O3) based on the ‘representative concentra-
tion pathway’ (van Vuuren et al., 2011) that most closely
matches the baseline used in this study. GENIEem cal-
culates the extent to which CO2 emissions remain in the
atmosphere and produces a time series of atmospheric CO2
concentration as output. Uncertainty in the carbon cycle is
captured by varying the internal parameters of GENIE-1,
resulting in an ensemble of 86 possible future atmospheric
CO2 concentration profiles.
GENIEem, in turn, provides inputs to the climate-
system model PLASIM-ENTSem (Holden et al., 2014),
an emulator of the PLAnet SIMulator (Fraedrich, 2012)
- coupled to the Efficient Numerical Terrestrial Scheme
(Williamson et al., 2006). Non-CO2 forcing is, again, pre-
scribed. Uncertainty is captured by varying PLASIM-
ENTS internal parameters, resulting in a 188-member en-
semble of decadally averaged seasonal climate variables.
The combination of the two emulators in the context of
this work, with combined uncertainty analysis, is described
in detail by Foley et al. (2014). First, PLASIM-ENTSem
is forced with the median of the GENIEem ensemble, and
the median, 5th and 95th percentiles of warming from
the resulting PLASIM-ENTSem ensemble are calculated;
these bounds, therefore, reflect warming uncertainty due
to parametric uncertainty in the climate model alone.
Next, PLASIM-ENTSem is forced with the 5th per-
centile CO2 concentration from the GENIEem ensem-
ble. The 5th percentile of warming from the result-
ing PLASIM-ENTSem ensemble is calculated. Finally,
PLASIM-ENTSem is forced with the 95th percentile CO2
concentration from the GENIEem ensemble, and the
95th percentile of warming from the resulting PLASIM-
ENTSem ensemble is calculated. These two simulations
form a second set of bounds, reflecting warming uncer-
tainty due to parametric uncertainty in the climate model
and the carbon cycle model.
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